It is often argued that experiments are strong on causal identification (internal validity) but weak on generalizability (external validity). One widely accepted way to limit threats to external validity is to incorporate as much variation in the background conditions and in the covariates as possible through replication. Another strategy is to make the theoretical foundations of the experiment more explicit. The latter requires that we develop trajectories of experiments that are consistent with a theoretical argument. In other words, new experiments should not simply consist of changing the context of old ones, but do so in ways that explicitly test various aspects of a theory in a coherent way.
Introduction
On December 17th 2007 1,431 poor families in New York city received a total of $740,000 as part of a conditional cash transfer anti-poverty program called Opportunity New York City.1 Notably, the design of Opportunity NYC was informed, to a large extent, by Progresa, a highly regarded conditional cash transfer initiated in Mexico in 1997 as a randomized field experiment.2 Accordingly, it is only natural to ask: Will the $53 million New York initiative be as successful as its Mexican predecessor? This is essentially a question of external validity, namely, the validity of inferences about whether a cause-effect relationship holds over variation in treatments, outcome measures, units and settings (Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002) . As such, it goes to the heart of policy motivated research, with its emphasis on determining what works under what conditions. That is, what, if anything, can we say about the casual effect of similar policies under different contexts?
The latter would be an idle question were it not for the fact that it arises quite often in applied work. Indeed, in the present case, the differences between Opportunity NYC and Progresa are just as striking as their common pedigree. To begin with, this is the first time such a conditional cash transfer is being tried in a large, wealthy city, whereas Progresa started out as a program for the rural poor. Second, the experimental units (the relevant NYC households) are significantly richer in absolute and relative terms than their Mexican counterparts. Indeed, poverty in the US might well be quite different 1 "[Conditional cash transfer] programs provide monetary incentives to households living in poverty when they complete activities aimed at increasing human capital development and breaking the cycle of poverty", from http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/html/programs/opportunity_nyc.shtml accessed 2/14/09. For an overview of Opportunity NYC see de Sá e Silva (2008) 2 http://www.rockfound.org/efforts/nycof/opportunity_nyc.shtml accessed 2/14/09. Please note that Progresa is now called Oportunidades. than poverty in rural Mexico, in terms of causes, consequences and solutions. Third, the intervention in NYC is also different, in that " [it] is the first program to include a significant workforce participation component in addition to the traditional health and education components." 3 Given significant variation in treatment, outcome measures, units and settings some have questioned whether Opportunity NYC will work at all: "[New York City Mayor] Bloomberg has misread the purpose of third-world conditional cash-transfer programs, and thus has misread their applicability to New York [. . . ] In New York, unlike in the third world, poor parents don't have to pay to send their children to school. Nor do they face the tough choice of educating the kids or having enough money to put food on the table every night." (Gelinas 2006 ). According to this critic, then, Progresa worked by relaxing a binding budget constraint on poor Mexican households, and because such a constraint is, under this interpretation, not binding amongst poor New Yorkers, Opportunity NYC will probably fail.
The uncertainty surrounding the generalizability of cause and effect relationships from field experiments like Progresa question, not just Mayor Bloomberg's wisdom, but the very enterprise of randomized experimentation for policy making. Experiments, it would seem, only have to offer a deeply unsatisfying Faustian bargain between internal and external validity: Yes, we are highly certain conditional cash transfers worked in Mexico, but remain deeply ambiguous about their potential success in NYC. This paper is motivated by the desire to help improve the terms of this Faustian bargain. In what follows we distinguish between the robustness and analytical approaches to external validity. The analytical approach proposes a series of theoretically motivated replications. This approach sees the problem of generalizability as intrinsically theoretical, in that theories about causal mechanisms, constructs, and selection are what allow us to generalize beyond sampling particulars in individual cases.
In the context of the NYC experiment, this approach could begin by theorizing about mediator and moderator variables that may dampen the extrapolation from Progresa, and then design a sequence of experiments that tests these hypotheses. 4 Indeed, randomized conditional cash transfers have been implemented in numerous countries, offering ample opportunity to test alternative causal mechanisms for better prediction out of sample (Rawlings 2005 , Das, Do & Ozler 2005 . Moreover, we may design small tests of specific implications of the theory, without having to replicate Progresa each time.
In contrast, the robustness approach relies on replication across various settings, (Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002) . Indeed, contra commonly held beliefs, experimentation is key to testing theories about external validity.
Besides motivating the desire for optimal learning, the distinction between the analytical and robustness approach has important practical consequences, as the payoff to more careful replication could be large. For example, the budget for Opportunity NYC has been set at $52 million, financed by the mayor himself and private foundations (it receives no public funds). This is a huge gamble. Some relatively inexpensive pilot testing and diagnosis may well reduce uncertainty, increasing the expected value of this, and other future replications. Thus, there may be large private and external gains to be had.
Finally, two caveats: First, whereas the sharp distinction between robustness and analytical approaches is useful as a rhetorical device, it is unlikely to be borne out in practice. In reality there is likely to be some amount of overlap, in that replications often embody some implicit prior or theory. Second, because our goal, at this stage, is to highlight some conjectures, the approach is discursive and not explicitly deductive. In ongoing work we formally apply the statistical learning and decision making literatures to the notion of external validity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section one, the introduction, is about to end. What we face is a problem of predictive ambiguity as, strictly speaking, the experiment reveals nothing about the density P'(y | Treatment) for the new units.
Predictive ambiguity arises whenever choice or behavior depends on an objective function with an unknown probability distribution (Manski 2008) . At this point we therefore need to make assumptions. We may, for example, assume that the new units are not materially different from the old ones, in which case our choice of predictor would be justified (i.e. is in accordance with out assumptions and loss function).
The fundamental problem is that external validity involves extrapolation of treatment effects to new units or, more generally, making predictions off the support of the estimated density function (which includes the experimental setting, outcome measure and treatment). As such, external validity claims are inherently ambiguous. Such problems with extrapolation arise whenever we ignore whether the units we want to make a prediction about belong together with the units used to estimate the density, either because we lack observable information about these units, or because some potentially relevant characteristics may be intrinsically unobservable. This, then, is the problem in making the projection from Progresa to NYC: we just cannot be sure these two policy experiments are sufficiently similar. But similar in what respects? In the next section we argue that they need to be similar in theoretically relevant aspects or, alternatively, that
we have a theory that allows us to bridge their differences.
As was argued in the introduction, the problem of extrapolation may be overcome in two ways (Manski 2008) . First, according to the robustness approach we may circumvent it altogether by performing a test that includes a sample from these new values (e.g. testing whether the new units vote after receiving the mailing). Of course, such trial and error can be very expensive and often impractical. A more nuanced version of this approach is to perform pilot test of a much larger intervention, say, by randomly sampling from the target population of treatments, units, settings and outcomes.
Unfortunately, such a population is ill defined for many experimental aspects, like treatments, outcome measures, and settings (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002) . For this reason we don't think that replication using random samples from a well defined population overcomes the problem of external validity altogether, as often this is not possible or it is too costly.
Second, the analytical approach relies on testable theories about cause and effect relationships to impose global shape restrictions, such as invariance, linearity or monotonicity of the estimated density. For example, to deal with extrapolation one could rely on theoretically motivated assumptions regarding invariance (e.g.
Here we assume that the new units, despite being o_ the support of P(y | x), are sufficiently similar in theoretically relevant aspects to the N experimental subjects, that we can predict their outcomes using the estimated density.
Gelinas's (2006) criticism of the NYC replication, above, essentially questions this invariance assumption, by arguing that NYC is not at all similar to Mexico.
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Alternatively, we may assume linearity or monotonicity, which allow us to adjust for relevant differences across units, settings and so on. The relevant assumption in this case is that the model is well specified for cases on and off the support, and that relevant moderators have been incorporated as factors into the original experiment. Accordingly, to make an ex-post prediction, we collect data on the relevant covariates specified by our theory for the units we want to make a prediction about and feed these inputs into the model to get a vector of predictions as the output. If the model predicts well out of sample we may gain further confidence in the assumption that it is well specified for some universe of cases, and so we may have more confidence in its predictions as more and more successful replications accumulate.
External validity as subjective
Now, assuming we have justified some assumptions and settled on a predictor to inform our bets, it remains for us to agree on a criterion that determines which bets win.
That is, what criterion determines external validity, or "whether a cause-effect an inference" yet, to the extent that we never really get to observe Truth, this is highly problematic. Besides, even if we did, we still need to deal with the issue of "moderate" differences in true parameters as, for most practical purposes, exact
matches is not what we are after. Instead, we propose a more pragmatic interpretation of validity, one built on the pillars of prediction and statistical decision theory.
Under the pragmatic criterion we propose, our concern with external validity stems from the need to decide whether or not to implement a program like Progresa, say, in NYC. That decision is often in the hands of a politician or high-level bureaucrat. If so, the preferences, opportunities and constraints of the decisions maker should enter into the ex-post assessment of the validity of the inference (Granger & Machina 2006) .
Consequently, to a first approximation, it is decision makers that determine the criteria for success.
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Although different decisions makers are likely to have different loss functions, and hence evaluate external validity differently, not everything goes. At a minimum, an externally valid extrapolation of a causal relation should be one that, once realized, results in a causal effect that is in the same direction as the prediction. In addition, the size of the causal effect must remain practically significant at some pre-determined level.
That is, the decision maker must evaluate the outcome in a fashion consistent with his ex ante loss function. An implication of this understanding, though one not pursued in this paper, is the need for better use of statistical decision theory in political science.
8
To recap, external validity is problematic because it involves extrapolation, that is, making predictions off the support of the estimated density. Whether the inferences regarding the applicability of the parameters of that density off the support is externally valid or not will therefore depend on the accuracy of its predictions out of sample -that 7 At this stage, for simplicity, we ignore the issue of whom the decision maker is, whether she is a high level bureaucrat, a politician, a set of voters, some abstract welfare maximizer or, indeed, a researcher evaluating a theory. We will simply postulate a decision maker, typically a politician, and leave it at that, as the relevant person may di_er between applications. We are aware this renders scientific knowledge somewhat subjective, but then again, a long literature in the philosophy of science questions the possibility of objective science.
8 See Gerber, Green & Kaplan (2002) for a rare exception in political science, and Berger (1985) and Manski (2008) for a more general discussion. This has three important corollaries, especially for policy motivated experiments, that often go unappreciated. First, only if the decision maker is planning to repeat the experiment elsewhere will she care about its conventional statistical significance over and beyond its practical significance. Second, having a well specified loss function allows the researcher to move away from simple point estimation, relaxing some assumptions and the somewhat exaggerated obsession with bias (see Rosenbaum (2002) for a discussion of sensitivity analysis and Manski (2008) for interval estimation). As such, the unbiased estimation made possible by randomized experiments may only be needed whenever good enough priors on the bias are lacking, preventing us from adjusting observational estimates to correct for the bias (Gerber, Green & Kaplan 2002 population. An obvious application of this is in studies of the genetic basis of disease and their interaction with potential remedies.
Third, most social science experiments are, explicitly or implicitly, encouragement designs (Horiuchi, Imai & Taniguchi 2007) . As such, treatment assignments do not guarantee compliance. To the extent that compliance rates vary across treatments, outcomes, units and settings, so will the average causal effect. To provide better predictions one could then proceed as above, modeling the population by characterizing it as a combination of compliers, defiers, never-and always-takers (Angrist, Imbens & Rubin 1996) , according to their individual attributes; then using this information to predict the proportion of compliers and others in the new target population; and, finally, computing the implied average treatment effect (or other effect of choice) in the target population using the predicted proportions (see Frangakis, Rubin & Zhou (2002) and Horiuchi, Imai & Taniguchi (2007) for specific applications).
In practice, all three issues -construct validity, systematic differences in levels of mediators and moderators, and systematic differences in shares of compliers, defiers, and never-and always-takers -will impact our estimates of average treatment effects, and so all three need to be considered simultaneously. Accordingly, what we ultimately need are good theoretical models of the latent construct, the causal mechanism, and selection into treatment; what are commonly referred to as structural equation models. 9 Such models embody global shape restrictions which, if correct, are what allow us to make good predictions out of sample. However, our purpose is not to argue for a return to the large structural equation models of the type once sponsored by the Cowles Commission, say, but simply to note that conceptualizing such models may help in the design of research programs, even if individual experiments remain much less complicated.
Theory, research programs and individual experiments
In practice, most experiments should not attempt to estimate such complex structural models, nor do they need the backing of a fully specified theory. Indeed, in the early stages of a research program concerns about external validity are often secondary to construct or internal validity. Rather, our argument is that, to the extent that external validity is desired in mature research programs, there are more efficient ways of achieving it than testing large structural models or blindly replicating as in the robustness approach. Rather experiments ought to quite deliberately test the appropriateness of assumed global shape restrictions.
For example, Mook (1983) cites the example of Ekman & Friesen (1971) who asked whether recognition of emotional facial expressions depended on culture. Rather than do innumerable replications across all possible cultures, they theorized that if facial expression were interpreted similarly across cultures, then this must be true across the most distant cultures. Hence, they "stress tested" the theory by comparing Americans to the most distant culture they could think of, the Fore of Papua New Guinea. The finding that they both recognize happiness in each other suggests the universality of emotional expression.
Similarly, going back to the NYC example above, if we think that a history of substance abuse is a significant moderator of the effect of conditional cash transfers say, then we may design an experiment that stress tests this aspect. Despite its narrow focus, the fact that this experiment is embedded in a larger research project may inform us greatly about the external validity of predictions based on Progresa, in so far as it may allow us to condition our expectations on the prevalence of substance abuse in the NYC target population.
Another example is the Benin electoral experiments (see Wantchekon 2003 , Wantchekon 2008 
Pros and cons of the analytical approach
The analytical approach to external validity we are proposing may be preferable for at least three reasons. First, the question of external validity is largely a theoretical one. Research on external validity asks, not just whether a conditional cash transfer programs will work in NYC, say, but "Why?" or "Why not?" That is, it demands an explication in terms of a causal mechanism or relevant differences between units in and out of sample. Indeed, for policy analysis, as well as for the purpose of scientific advancement through comparative research, the question of where, under what conditions, and amongst which sub-populations a treatment is likely to work, is often as interesting as whether or not the treatment worked in the first place (Heckman 2005) . As such, the analytical approach is of interest in and of itself.
Second, answering these questions may provide us with tighter bounds on future predictions out of sample, and increase our confidence in the maintained shape restrictions. Moreover, a program of research that focuses on external validity will subject theories to the strongest possible tests -out of sample tests -offering the potential for large updates in our priors.
Third, we conjecture that theoretically driven research programs will allow us an opportunity to design experimental replications for optimal learning. Or, to paraphrase Milton Friedman, to come up with sequences of experiments that explain as much as possible in the shortest possible sequence.
This being said, the analytical approach is not foolproof. One could argue that the external validity criticism applies just as readily to a more fully specified causal mechanism, construct and selection process than to a simple one. After all, moderator or mediator variables in one setting may be different, or have different impacts, in new settings, populations, treatments or outcome measures, and so extrapolation is not possible. For example, household income may be a moderator of the effects of Progresa in Mexico but not in NYC, perhaps due to some unobserved interacting variable. All this is certainly possible, but there are at least three powerful rejoinders.
First, we can test this criticism. If the moderators are found to behave similarly in Mexico as in NYC then we have more confidence in projecting treatment effects to Los
Angeles and Kuala Lumpur, say, than if we had replicated without a theory. The latter does not allow us to make accurate predictions because we are not using all the available information efficiently, by conditioning on the relevant moderators and mediators. As a result, robustness replication yields more uncertain predictions and represents a very inefficient way of cumulating knowledge. Our view is that theorists explain and empiricists condition, doing neither greatly limits external validity.
Second, pushed to the extreme, the criticism is a reductio ad absurdum. It simply negates the whole basis of comparative research. If causal and selection mechanisms are different across all variations in settings, populations, treatments or outcome, then we have no basis for generalizations. Without theorizing, each construct, treatment, outcome measure, unit, and setting is unique -the possibility of scientific learning denied. This may well be the case, but it is a testable proposition.
Third, the focus is on the generalizability skeptic to propose why he thinks the inference is not generalizable. Indeed, this is what Rosenbaum (2002) calls tangible criticism: "a specific and plausible alternative interpretation of the available data; indeed a tangible criticism is itself a scientific theory, itself capable of empirical investigation."
In contrast, dismissive criticism "rests on the authority of the critic and is so broad and vague that that its claims cannot be studied empirically."
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To sum up, think of the replication process as an optimal learning problem. Our contention is that the analytical approach will require fewer iterations to achieve a given uncertainty tolerance (about external validity) than the robustness one or, alternatively, reduce uncertainty further for any given number of replications. As Guala and Mittone (2005) state "external validity is an important issue for experimenters and theorists alike"
(emphasis in original).
The robustness and the analytical approach somewhat resemble the difference between active and passive learning (Castro et al. 2008) or the problems faced in dynamic control programming. As that literature implies, there are tradeoffs to be made between the analytical and robustness approaches. For example, testing some theories will require factorial designs, which in turn may involve larger samples. Yet this may still be cheaper than testing hypotheses separately and, to the extent that they generate 10 Experimenters ought to make the experiment as sound as possible to begin with, by stating potential mediators say and, whenever the budget allows, testing them. Rather, our point is that in order to help discover whether a design is indeed awed, the critic needs to specify why he thinks the design is faulty in the first place. Off-the-cuff criticism of the sort "experiments have no external validity" are, on this account, unhelpful and often dismissive.
sensible findings, may substantially improve our predictions out of sample.
Old wine in new bottles?
Theory already permeates everything we do, form the questions we ask, to the data we collect, to how we define our concepts, while others have also written extensively on the topic. 11 For example, take one of the most successful and comprehensive experimental research programs in political science, the series of field experiments on voter mobilization spawned by the work of Gerber & Green (2000) and reviewed in Green & Gerber (2008) . The use of theory is clear in the choice of treatments: researchers have studied whether mass mailing, door-to-door canvassing and so on impact turn out, but not the impact of mailings printed with Times New Roman versus Arial font, as we have no theoretical basis for presuming these might be causally relevant.
Fact is, most replications are already theory driven, explicitly or not. For example, the finding by Gerber & Green (2000) that phone calls are ineffective in getting out the vote relative to personal face to face contact motivated Nickerson (2006) Besides, what about the idea that the best predictors are often a-theoretical associations a la Sims (1980) .
Prediction and understanding are all closely related. Yet an example due to
Rubin perhaps best highlights their differences: suppose an unfair coin yields heads with probability 0.6. A model that predicts heads with probability 1 will get it right 60 per cent of the time, one predicting heads with probability of 0.6 will get it right 36 per cent of the time (0:62). On the basis of predictive success we would be tempted to choose the wrong model, even if it cannot explain the observed sequence of tosses and, in particular, the 40 per cent of tails. So prediction cannot be all that there is to it. However, our point is not that external validity ought to be the only goal of science, rather our claim is that the best way to test external validity is to test predictions out of sample. Different goals require different tests.
For example, in a widely cited article Mook (1983) criticized the preference, then prevalent in psychology, for experiments with strong external validity. His argument relied on a distinction between prediction and understanding or, as he put it, between two modes of research: the analogue model of research and the analytical model of research.
In the analogue model of research, the objective is to model the real world for prediction purposes. Thus, the variables that account for the most real world variance are the most important, since they are the ones that speak most directly to our ability to make predictions about causal relations. 12 In the analytic model of research, by contrast, the objective is to understand the workings of a system, to test the internal validity of theories. These theories may apply to real life, but there is no attempt at generalization at this point.
In a similar vein, Przeworski (2007) Note that our answer to these questions may significantly influence how we answer their corollary, "Can X be manipulated so as to change Y in a desired direction?" This is important for two reasons: first, because by knowing the actual causes of a disease, say, we might be better able to design prevention measures and, second, because causes that are effective in the lab may not be efficacious in the field.
For example, take the efficacy of bed nets in preventing Malaria. Under control conditions bed nets have been shown to be highly effective in preventing malaria:
Households randomly "treated" with bed nets experience a reduction in malaria incidence relative to households randomly allocated to control conditions. These controlled experiments identify the "effects of causes", in this case bed net use reduces malaria incidence. Based on this evidence, numerous programs have been implemented that freely distribute bed nets in areas of high malaria incidence. And yet, to date, the jury is still out as to the effectiveness of these interventions in reducing malaria incidence in the treated areas. Why? One answer is lack of compliance -providing a free bed net does not imply that it will be used appropriately.
This example illustrates the point that just because X can be shown to cause changes in Y , it does not follow that it explains any of the observed variance in Y in the real world nor, indeed, that it can be an effective cause in the real world -a problem of external validity -, where we may lack sufficient control to ensure full compliance. In other words, there are other factors (potentially unobserved) that moderate the causal effect in real applications. In Mook's terminology, we gain understanding of potential causes for reducing malaria, but we may still end up with bad policy predictions.
Understanding what are the actual causes of some phenomenon should inform our predictions and research. This is what motivated psychologist Egon Brunswick to advocate "representative designs" where, in particular, levels of the causal variable in question would be chosen according to their conditional distribution in the natural world (Albright & Malloy 2000) .
Accordingly, the idea that distribution of free bed net will somehow generate the treated counterfactual observed in controlled trials may appear far-fetched. For all we know the given distribution of bed nets in any country is an equilibrium -everyone who wants one has one -so reducing their price to zero may have a tiny effect in that, at some point, there is no longer a binding budget constraint (Gelinas (2006) point above). In fact, it is entirely possible that there is simply no way to generate the experimental counterfactual in the field without, at the same time, changing the levels of other covariates (potentially unobserved). Perhaps malaria eradication requires a process of modernization that includes improved education as to the pathogenic nature of the disease, better drainage, urbanization, air conditioning, better medical facilities, and so on which, by the way, speaks to the important development literature on the sequencing of reforms and the need for theories of change.
To conclude this section, we note that linking external validity to the capacity to make reasonable causal predictions out of sample in no way undermines the importance of theory to the enterprise, nor the value of understanding. Prediction and understanding may have slightly different goals but, ultimately, a good measure of useful knowledge is a test of the external validity of its predictions. In addition, sound understanding of the actual causes of effects may help us theorize about causal mechanism and optimal interventions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we argue claims to external validity of randomized field experiments are stronger when theoretical connections between experiments are established and tested. In an experiment that establishes a causal relationship between the two variables (the treatment and an outcome of interest), under a set of conditions, we can improve external validity in at least two ways: (1) by replicating the relationship between the two variables under new conditions (the robustness approach) or (2) by establishing that the relationship is mediated or moderated by the set of variables i.e. the analytical approach.
We claim the analytical approach may turn out to be more effective than the robustness approach. This is because the mediator is likely to represent a larger set of experimental conditions. We recommend that follow up experiments be primarily focused on testing the theoretical argument of original experiments, instead of simply replicating them in a different context. If external validity is the Achilles' heel of randomized experiments, then testing mechanisms underlying already established causal relationships should be the top priority of the experimental research.
